Maryland Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 2

Article 6

Liability of Tavernkeeper for Subsequent Act of
Intoxicated Patron - State v. Hatfield

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Liability of Tavernkeeper for Subsequent Act of Intoxicated Patron - State v. Hatfield, 14 Md. L. Rev. 161 (1954)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/6

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

19541

STATE v. HATFIELD

LIABILITY OF TAVERNKEEPER FOR SUBSEQUENT
ACT OF INTOXICATED PATRON
State v. Hatfield'
Defendants operated a tavern in a remote section of
Baltimore County which could be reached conveniently
only by automobile. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
knowingly sold liquor to one Love, a minor, in violation of
statute,2 and knowingly continued to sell to him in further
violation after they knew, or should have known, that he
was intoxicated and unable properly to operate his automobile. After leaving the tavern, Love drove at an unreasonable speed, on the left of the highway, and crashed into
a car operated by one Joyce, and killed him. The plaintiffs
allege this accident was the direct result of defendant tavern
keeper's negligent and unlawful conduct.
Suit for wrongful death was filed in the name of the
State of Maryland, for the benefit of the surviving widow
of the deceased.3 The defendants demurred. The lower
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and
the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, in
absence of statute, no cause of action could be established
against the seller of intoxicating liquor for causing the intoxication of a person whose subsequent negligent or wilful
act caused an injury to the plaintiff.
This case can be analyzed from two separate points of
view. First is the view adopted by the lower court and
upheld in the Court of Appeals regarding the common law
liability of saloonkeepers for the result of sales of intoxicants to an able-bodied man. Or, as an alternative, the
basic rules of proximate cause can be applied.
In many states, statutes known as "Civil Damage Laws"
have been enacted which impose an almost absolute liability on liquor dealers for injuries sustained by innocent
persons injured by those who purchased the intoxicants
from the saloonkeeper.4 Cases under these so-called "dram
shop laws" have been successfully litigated in many juris197 Md. 249, 78 A. 2d 754 (1951).
'Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 2B, Sec. 103 [Now Md. Code (1951), Art. 2B,
Sec. 114, as amended by Md. Laws (1953), Ch. 700].
'Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 67, Secs. 1-4 [Now Md. Code (1951), Sees.
1-4]. This action was created in Maryland in 1852 and was based on Lord
Campbell's Act of England in 1846.
' These statutes have closely followed the Illinois statute of 1872; now
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953), Ch. 43, Sec. 135.
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dictions.5 No such statute has ever been passed in Maryland,
perhaps on the ground that such a law would impose too
great a burden on taverns. As Judge Markell clearly points
out in the principal case:
"In the course of the last hundred years there probably has seldom, if ever, (except during prohibition)
been a regular session of the General Assembly at
which no liquor laws were passed. On few subjects are
legislators kept better informed of legislation in other
states. In the face of the flood of civil damage laws
enacted, amended and repealed in other states and the
Volstead Act - and of the total absence of authority for
such liability, apart from statute - the fact that there
is now no such law in Maryland expresses the legislative intent as clearly and compellingly as affirmative
legislation would."'
Though no prior Maryland case directly in point can be
found, a wealth of authority from other jurisdictions can
be cited, holding that in the absence of statute the common
law did not hold the saloonkeeper liable for the actions of
those he permitted to become intoxicated.7 In a Wisconsin
case relied on by defendants it is specifically stated that:
"The cases are overwhelmingly to the effect that
there is no cause of action at common law against a
vendor of liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the vendee."'
The reason for the common law rule is not quite clear.
Perhaps it stems from the doctrine of proximate cause, with
the court's feeling that the act of the purchaser is an intervening superseding cause. On the other hand the tendency
to accept the non-liability rule without too close an analysis
of the reason therefore is illustrated by the language of a
recent Georgia case which stated:
"Whatever the reasons for such a rule, and whether
we agree or disagree with them, the courts have no
5Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873) ; Struble v. Nodwift, 11 Ind. 64 (1858) ;
Mulford v. Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191 (1871) ; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509
(1878) (Held constitutional).
State v. Hatfield, 8upra, n. 1, 256.
Sworski v. Coleman, 204 Minn. 474, 283 N. W. 778 (1939); Hitson v.
Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 803, 143 Pac. 2d 952 (1943) ; and authorities collected in
30 Am. Jur., Sec. 607, p. 573, and 48 C. J. S., Sec. 430, p. 716, which states:
"At common law, and apart from statute, no redress exists against
persons selling, giving, or furnishing intoxicating liquor, . . . for resulting injuries or damages due to the acts of intoxicated persons, .
'Demge v. Felerstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N. W. 210, 212 (1936).
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authority to grant recoveries or authorize actions unknown to the common law." 9
This seems to express the view adopted by the Court of
Appeals in deciding the principal case. That is, to do otherwise would amount to judicial legislation. But, quaere:
whether it would be any more judicial legislation than many
other judicial expansions of common law rules to meet
changing conditions?
Though the common law liability may not exist yet
perhaps a different result might be had if the case were
viewed purely as a matter of proximate cause. Many tests
have been suggested to aid in finding the proximate cause
of an injury. 1° The courts have generally adopted either the
"but for"" or the "substantial factor"12 method in deciding
whether the defendants negligence was the proximate cause
of the resulting injury. The former test asks the question,
"but for the defendant's negligent conduct would the accident have occurred anyway?" The latter test inquires if
the defendant's negligent conduct was a substantial factor
in bringing about the plaintiff's injury. Since the principal
case was decided on different grounds, neither test was
applied to the facts of this case. In applying the "but for"
test, is it reasonable to suppose that if the tavernkeeper
had not sold liquor to an already intoxicated minor the
accident in which the innocent motorist was killed would
not have occurred? Using the alternate test, would supplying an intoxicated minor with liquor be a "substantial
factor" causing the resulting collision?
It has been held that:
"Where the negligence of the defendant greatly
multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff, and
is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the
mere possibility that it might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain
of cause13 and effect between the negligence and the
injury."
9
Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S. E. 2d 329, 333
(1943).
10 Pnosst, ToaTs, (1st Ed., 1941), Sec. 45.
n Op. cit., ibid, 322; Hayes Freight Lines v. Wilson, 226 Ind. 1, 77 N. E.
2d 580, 582 (1948). See also for interesting discussions on Proximate Cause,
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HarT. L. Rev. 103 (1911), Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 211 (1924), and Green, RATIONALE OF

PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, (1934), See. 431.

2Reynolds v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (1885).
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Can it not be argued that the defendant's act of selling
liquor to a drunken minor multiplied the chances of the
subsequent accident particularly in view of the isolated
area in which the defendant's tavern was located?
Selling liquor to an already intoxicated minor, in violation of a statute, is to say the least, evidence of negligence. 4
A basic rule of tort law is that one guilty of doing an wrongful act is liable for all damages which are the proximate
and natural outgrowth of the act. 5 The accident, in the
principal case, could be easily reasoned to be a proximate
and natural outgrowth of the tavernkeeper's negligence certainly not an entirely unconnected or even unforseeable
result.
But is the act of Love an independent intervening cause
which would break the chain of causation and relieve the
defendants of liability? 6 Where a minor was sold intoxicating liquor and while under its influence committed a murder it has been held that no action would lie against the
saloonkeeper since the subsequent criminal act of the minor
was an independent intervening act which cut off any liability of the vendor of the liquor. 7 However, the commission of murder is highly unforeseeable, while negligent
operation of an automobile by an intoxicated minor is not.
Knowing the isolated location of their tavern, it should
have been apparent that the intoxicated purchaser would
have to leave the tavern by automobile. Knowing this the
tavernkeeper should have foreseen that selling liquor to the
purchaser, in his condition, would greatly multiply the
chances of his having an accident and injuring other users
of the highway. Here, the selling of liquor was not a remote
cause; it was a directly contributing and proximate cause
of the resulting automobile accident. It should be remembered the tavern derived its patronage entirely from motorists. Therefore, should not the accident which resulted have
been easily foreseeable to a reasonable man?
On frequent occasion the Court of Appeals has faced the
question of proximate cause. It has held a bus operator
liable to an alighting passenger who was struck by a speeding car when the bus straddled the road at night leaving its
'AViolation of a statute is evidence of negligence in Maryland, State v.
Hecht Company, 165 Md. 415, 169 A. 311 (1933).
PROSSER, op. cit., supra, n. 10, Sec. 48; Lashley v. Dawson, 162 Md. 549,
160 A. 738 (1932) ; Northeast Auto Wreckers v. Sanford, 43 A. 2d 292 (D. C.
Mun. Ap., 1945).
"RESTATEMENT, Toxrs, (1934), Sec. 442(e) (f).
17Waller's Adm'r v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S. W. 766 (1911) ; see also
exhaustive note in 130 A. L. R. 366.
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interior light unlit.18 The Court, speaking through Judge
Offutt said:
o... 'no wrongdoer ought to be allowed to apportion
or qualify his own wrong, and that, as a loss has actually happened whilst his own wrongful act was in force
and operation, he ought not to be permitted to set up
as a defense that there was a more immediate cause of
the loss, if that cause was put into operation by his own
wrongful act'."' 9
Applying Judge Offutt's careful reasoning, one would have
to conclude the wrongful act of the tavernkeeper in the principal case remained in force and operation until the time of
the fatal accident.
The Court has also allowed recovery against the city
where a pedestrian was struck by a trash can placed so
near the street by a city employee that a passing vehicle
struck the can and threw it against the plaintiff." In this
case the actual injury was caused by the motorist striking
the can, but the court felt the proximate cause was the
city's negligence in setting the stage for the accident.
Applying this concept to the principal case, the actual cause
of Joyce's death was the minor's negligent operation of the
automobile, but did not the operators of the tavern set the
stage for the accident through their negligence? One has
to wonder if the principal case doesn't represent a retreat
from the more liberal view followed by the Court of Appeals
in the above cases?
Perhaps a rough analogy can be drawn to the question
of liability of parents for the torts of their children, particularly in regard to the so-called "family car doctrine".
This doctrine, which holds the head of a family liable for
damages caused by members of the family in the operation
of the family car, has been repeatedly rejected by the Court
of Appeals.2 And yet in the case of Rounds, Admr. v.
2 2 the court
Phillips,
held it was sufficient to create liability
if it could be proved that a parent failed to prohibit the
operation of an automobile by his child when he knew or
should have known that the child was incompetent in the
operation of an automobile. Thus, though the Court of
Appeals refuses to impose absolute liability on the head of
Lashley v. Dawson, 8upra, n. 15.
Ibid, W6.
Baltimore v. Terio, 147 Md. 330, 128 A. 353 (1925) ; see also: Blood v.
Good Humor, 179 Md. 384, 18 A. 2d 592 (1941).
Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 A. 645 (1922) ; Baitary v. Smith, 140
Md. 437, 116 A. 651 (1922).
"166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1934) ; noted 2 Md. L. Rev. 288 (1938).
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a family for the negligence of an offspring in the operation
of the parent's automobile, liability is not excluded in every
case. The Rounds case indicated the court will judge every
case of this type on its merits and not follow any basic
overall rule.
Applying such an approach to the principal case, it is
felt that to judge all cases in relation to the common law
liability of saloonkeepers will in many cases render unfair
results. To give saloonkeepers absolute freedom from liability for subsequent damage caused by those they permit
to become intoxicated would be as unjust as creating absolute liability under the "family car doctrine", which Maryland has refused to do.
It is suggested that those cases which involve a saloonkeeper's liability should be determined by the basic rules
which apply to any other proximate cause case. To continue
to follow the solidified rule of the common law would be
to grant a certain unwarranted immunity to taverns. This
does not mean that the absolute liability as imposed by
statute in many states is preferable; rather each case should
be treated on its merits. In cases where the saloonkeeper
merely supplied intoxicants to his patron in a legal and
reasonable manner, no recovery should be had by one later
injured by the intoxicated vendee. But where the saloonkeeper knowingly supplies intoxicants to one already intoxicated, and in violation of statute, it would seem that
this might be found to be the proximate cause of the subsequent injury of a third party and recovery could be had.
That is to say, the tavernkeeper should not be permitted
to hide his negligence behind the common law rule denying
liability, at least not predicated upon an assumption that to
rule otherwise would be judicial legislation. If Courts had
not accepted in the past the responsibility of expanding the
common law as the needs of society demanded, pressures
for change in the "horse and buggy days" rules would have
long since resulted in abolition of the common law in favor
of codification of all law.

